Gas Trading with Tariff Versus Sanction as a Networked Game
Résumé
The economies of many geographic markets are dependent on fossil fuels, e.g., gas. Due to
geopolitical tensions, some geographic markets may decide to partially or totally halt their gas
trades. We therefore propose a model which casts the optimal taxation problem as a networked
game in two settings: a) perfect competition, where a global market operator is responsible for
adjusting the export prices, leading to a partial equilibrium; b) a variational approach, where
the export prices are determined endogenously as dual variables of the supply-demand balances.
Our model is built on an agent based representation of suppliers and generators interacting in a
certain number of geographic markets. We aim to assess the impact of tariffs or sanctions on the
geographic markets’ imports of gas and on their utility. To that purpose, the optimal taxation
problem is framed as a Stackelberg game where a regulator at the upper level is responsible for
the sanction definition considering different criteria, while the geographic market at the lower
level reacts by adjusting their exports and trade prices. We derived closed-form expressions for
the export prices, and proved that the Stackelberg equilibria can be explicitely mapped to the
perfect competition equilibria. Finally, considering a degree of bounded rationality on the part of
stakeholders, we rely on Prospect Theory to extend the optimal taxation games to in situations
involving risks linked to the behavior of other market stakeholders.
Domaines
Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]Origine | Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s) |
---|